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I want to thank Chairman Aspin and his colleagues for inviting me to testify about a reform perspective in the Gulf War.

Naturally, I cannot speak explicitly for the other reformers. We are not a monolith but have different views that fit into a common theme. In this sense what I have to say are my own views but connected to this theme.

for the
engineer

In this context I would like to point out the features that make up this theme by returning to a presentation on "Reforming the Military" that was drafted some 9 or 10 years ago, although some aspects of this presentation are outdated certain key features are not and are still being used as a basis for describing what it takes for creating a winning military.

First of all from a reform perspective if we ask what does it take to win wars? Reformers believe that there are three basic elements and in order of importance they are:

- People because wars are fought by people not weapons
- Strategy and Tactics because wars fought without innovative ideas become ... bloodbaths winnable or not.

- Hardware, because weapons that don't work or can't be bought in adequate quantity will bring down even the best people and best ideas.

In looking at these three elements we must keep in mind that the most important element in winning is to have ~~better~~ military people that are better than the enemy's. How is this accomplished? By:

- Attracting and promoting people who have the character, skill and initiative to succeed in combat
- Training to hone combat skills and also to build tactical imagination and initiative.
- Building the personal bonds for unit cohesion since cohesion keeps units from crumbling under combat stress

Next our military needs to be trained in innovative tactics and strategies that will lead to quick, decisive victories at minimum cost in American lives.

This requires, first, an understanding of conflict. Conflict can be viewed as repeated cycles of observing - orienting - deciding - acting by both sides (and at all levels). The adversary that can move through these cycles faster gains an inestimable advantage by disrupting his

his enemy's ability to respond effectively.

These create continuous and unpredictable change. Therefore, our tactics and strategy need to be based on the idea of adapting to and shaping this change faster than the enemy. Why? Because the confusion and disorder so generated permits us to win quickly at minimum cost in American lives.

Finally in terms of hardware what counts is ~~having~~ having a lot of it and making sure it works effectively in combat.

More specifically, the hardware numbers that count are the weapons available to engage the enemy.

Weapons in the hangars and maintenance pits are a liability, not an asset.

New hardware needs to be evaluated in terms of its effects on our people and our tactics. Effective hardware helps our people adapt to change and permits them to act, react, and move faster than the enemy. Any hardware that makes our military slow and ~~un~~predictable is unsuitable.

With all these previous comment in mind the lopsided victory in the Gulf seems to suggest that the American military, after many years of frustration, have come ^{very} a long way. The brilliant strategy, the fast-paced operation and the multiple thrust tactics impressed everyone. Of course we need a more detailed look here to appreciate how all this played together. As I understand it, the military services are in the process of conducting such an examination. We will have to wait on whatever results they make available.

Even so, the magnitude of success suggests we must have been attracting and promoting at least some of the right people otherwise such strategy, operations, and tactics would not have been produced. On the other hand as I shall point out shortly we still have problems in this area.

As to hardware, testimony already given suggests that we had some great successes, also some disappointments, ~~and~~ but ~~the other hand~~ we must look more deeply into the war before drawing any clear conclusions about hardware performance.

Not wishing to comment further on the Strategy, Operations and Tactics nor on the hardware until the previously discussed evaluations are made available, I will now focus on how well the military has responded to a couple of officers who helped make maneuver warfare a reality that, in turn, made possible the impressive Gulf military victory.

Specifically I would like to bring your attention to two key ^{officers} ~~players~~ who have had a major impact on their respective services in the conception and practice of maneuver warfare.

Before getting into this story let me explain why it is of crucial national importance to understand the role of these two officers who introduced the new ideas that made a quick relatively bloodless victory in the Gulf possible.

First we need to understand that throughout history the difference between brilliantly performing armies and mediocre ones has always rested on a small handful of combat leaders. Naturally, the military that manages to nurture and advance such a tiny handful of brilliant, innovative officers to combat commands achieves great results. On the other hand, a military that suppresses such

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brilliant and unconventional young officers
among them (who ^{I might add} level to make life
uncomfortable for the seniors) is
forced to grind out rigid,
predictable battles with much blood
and mountains of matériel.

Secondly, we need to understand there is a difference between physical courage in battle and the moral courage that is required to introduce and implement new ideas in military bureaucracies. If you haven't been there, you can't imagine the intense pressures and high career risks facing a young officer, who, out of conscience, is trying to introduce unconventional new ideas. In my opinion, officers with physical courage are far more abundant than officers with the moral courage I have just described.

With these thoughts in mind
we can now return to the two
officers I am about to introduce
you to.

First the army: Prior to 1982 the US Army's basic manual for warfighting, FM 100-5 emphasized an attrition scheme via firepower and frontal assaults against ~~on~~ oncoming enemy thrusts. Even if such an unimaginative scheme could win, it would produce a high

body count of our own soldiers. Needless to say, such a scheme doesn't represent an attractive proposition to the Troops who are supposed to carry it out. One of those Troops, an officer named Huba Wasie Czege, had the feeling such an approach just wouldn't do. He had the tenacity and insight to dig deep into combat history and military theory -- two unpopular and neglected areas in the army of that era.

Despite resistance he was able to form a team to rewrite FM 100-5 and even more amazingly he had the courage to completely overturn the tradition bound 1976 version of 100-5. His 1982 version ~~of 100-5~~ introduced an untraditional philosophy of maneuver warfare -- based upon an integrated effort of initiative, agility and deep attack behind enemy lines. The army refined and updated this manual in 1986 with no change in basic philosophy, thus showing that these new ideas had taken root.

Wasie Czege was also responsible for setting up the School for Advanced Military Studies at The Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. -- a second ~~to~~ year course for a very

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few of the college's best graduates. This school was specifically set-up in 1983 to introduce and eventually diffuse the concept and practice of maneuver warfare throughout the army.

Apparently the army was satisfied with Wass de Gzege's courageous innovations. Today he is a one star general highly respected and sought after by both superior officers and officers junior to him, and graduate of his school known as Jedi knights were heavily represented on Gen Schwarzkopf's operations planning staff.

For another officer, a Marine, who became interested in the concept and practice of maneuver warfare the story is a bit different.

More than ~~two~~^{three} years before Wass de Gzege's innovations Mike Wyly a Marine officer became concerned about the way Marines viewed the concepts and practices associated with war. A highly respected company commander with two Vietnam combat tours behind him he felt the Marines needed a new approach to warfighting. By the late 1970's his dissatisfaction brought him into contact with the newly emerging ideas associated with maneuver warfare.

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He recognized that these ideas offered a way out of the high casualty morass he personally experienced in Vietnam.

Shortly after absorbing these ideas, he began laying out his version of maneuver warfare via articles in the Marine Corps Gazette as well as by testing these ideas in the field and refining them based upon his own field experiences and tactical exercises. Out of this he produced unconventional thinking memoranda of how maneuver warfare should be conducted at the tactical level. These ideas were eventually incorporated in Bill Lind's highly regarded "Maneuver Warfare Handbook".

As his efforts became more and more visible other officers, primarily junior officers, sought him out so they might learn these new unconventional methods that were not yet part of the Marine way of warfighting. Unsurprisingly, a number of higher ranking officers tried to suppress his efforts by transferring him elsewhere where his efforts would have far less impact or by placing officers about him who were ~~unsympathetic~~ unsympathetic to what he was trying to accomplish. This was done several times. Even so, ~~this~~ Mike Ugly's ideas did find acceptance among a few (very few).

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senior officers including then
M/General Al Gray. Eventually after
many frustrating years of trying to
advance these unconventional ideas
the Marine Corps under Commandant
Gen. Al Gray made Maneuver
Warfare Marine Corps Doctrine.

In 1989 the Marine's version
~~version~~ of maneuver warfare was
officially proclaimed in their new
warfighting manual FMFM 1.
Col Wyly and his ideas had
finally arrived -- or had they.

For his untiring and courageous
efforts Col Wyly has been recently
informed by a Marine board of
officers that he must take an
early retirement (8 months early).
This would suggest there are some
maybe even many, senior ^{Marine} officers
who would still like to retain
the old attrition warfighting
mindset, despite the use of Col
Wyly's ideas which contributed
mightily to a relatively painless,
extremely low casualty military
victory.

Col. This raises the question: Why should
we make such a fuss over ^{only} one Colonel?
First, because if nothing is done about
Mike Wyly, for at least the next
four years young officers in the
Marine Corps will be inhibited from
proposing important, perhaps crucial

new ideas. Secondly, if nothing is done about Mike Wyle and the people who forced him out then the Marine Corps will be left in the hands of dinosaurs who will ~~undo~~ the maneuver warfare ideas that worked so well for the marines in the Gulf.

Lets face it, its time to stop paying only lip service to the idea that people are the most important element in warfighting. Mike Wyle's experience caused me to think that we haven't made much progress since WWII in finding and promoting brilliant, innovative, unconventional officers. In fact my intuition would say we may even have taken a step backward in this area and ^{it} may well go beyond the Marine Corps.

Naturally, the military likes to treat the matter of officer selection and promotion as sacrosanct and as purely an internal military matter. On the other hand, if we really believe that people are of a much higher priority than hardware and budgets, then it is of overwhelming importance that the Congress ^{in some way} get involved in the issue of selection and promotion of people. Why? Because no amount of money can make up for deficiencies

in this area.

I am prepared to comment on the kind of hearings Congress might hold and the possible actions that might serve to improve our track record in advancing these few gifted, unconventional officers.

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Heavy focus should be about

- Case studies of specially gifted officers who have been badly treated by promotion board
- Adequacy of O&K's
- Prevalence of backchannel appointment and influence
- Influence of whether Academy background gives undeserved advantage toward promotion